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Uncertainty, insufficient informationor informationof poor quality, limited cognitive capacityand time, alongwith
valueconflictsandethical considerations, areall aspects thatmake riskmanagementand risk communicationdif-
ficult. This paper provides a review of different risk concepts and describes how these influence riskmanagement,
communication and planning in relation to forest ecosystemservices. Based on the reviewand results of empirical
studies, we suggest that personal assessment of risk is decisive in themanagement of forest ecosystem services.
The results are used together with a review of different principles of the distribution of risk to propose an approach
to risk communication that is effective aswell as ethically sound. Knowledge of heuristics andmutual information
on both beliefs anddesires are important in the proposed risk communication approach. Such knowledge provides
an opportunity for relevant information exchange, so that gaps in personal knowledge maps can be filled in and
effective risk communication can be promoted.
Introduction
Uncertainty, insufficient informationor informationofpoorquality,
limited cognitive capacity and time, alongwith value conflicts and
ethical considerations, are all aspects that make decision-making
difficult.
By way of example, Swedish private forest owners consider
damage by wind to represent one of the greatest risks to their for-
estry from the perspective of their individual income; however,
according to a questionnaire, only one-third of Swedish private
forest owners reported that they had actively taken measures to
reduce the risk of wind damage (Blennow and Sallna¨s, 2002). The
lack of action to reduce this risk may be because the owner does
not perceive the risk to behigh enough, but there are other possible
explanations.Nottakingmeasurestoreducetheriskofwinddamage
might verywellmake sense, even to a forest owner who perceives a
high risk and also knows how to reduce it. For example, the forest
owners may value the plant twinflower (Linnaea borealis) and thus
wouldwish topreserve its habitat – thedense canopyof old-growth
coniferous forest – at the expense of lighter forests inwhich the risk
ofwinddamagehasbeen reducedbya shorter rotation cycle. In this
case, it makes sense to run the risk of wind damage, because the
measures required to reduce that risk would increase the risk of
losing twinflowers from the forest. However, for researchers who
have exerted substantial effort trying to find ways to reduce the
likelihood of wind damage, the fact that relatively few forest
owners have taken such measures may be difficult to understand.
The aim of this study is to provide a review of risk concepts and
risk communication research, to illustrate the significance of the
choice of conceptual approach for themanagement and planning
of forest ecosystem services and to provide an approach to risk
communication that is effective as well as ethically sound.
Risk and risk communication
Like all risks, forest-related risks vary with respect to magnitude,
seriousness, etc. In general, it is taken for granted that the lan-
guage of risk is a way of describing uncertain negative outcomes.
Outcome risk is often seen as a combination of probability and se-
verity of the negative effect. For instance, Aven and Renn (2009,
p. 1) suggested that: ‘Risk refers to uncertainty about and severity
of the consequences (or outcomes) of an activity with respect to
something that humans value’. They partly base their suggestion
on similar definitions of outcome risk in the literature, such as:
‘Risk is the probability of an adverse outcome’ (Graham and
Weiner, 1995)and ‘risk is ameasure of the probability and severity
ofadverseeffects’ (Lowrance,1976).Thiswayofdefining risk isalso
prevalent in relation to forestry. For instance, Guthrie (2009)
reported that in landslide studies linked to forestry operations,
risk is broadly defined as: ‘The likelihood of specified adverse
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consequencesarising fromanevent, circumstanceoractionwithin
a stated period and area’ (Lee and Jones, 2004).
Outcome risk as an objective attribute
In the early years of risk communication research, it was believed
that clear, understandable information was all that was needed
to make people see that the (outcome) risks were in accordance
with the assessments of experts (see Fischoff, 1995) (Table 1).
One concept of risk that might lead to such a situation is where
both experts and laymen understand a risk as being identical to
probability and where scientific research has produced a base
from which to monitor the relative frequency of the type of risk in
question. For example, according to To¨rnqvist (1995), in its early
days, Swedish forestry was treated as an enterprise that was
guided by scientific results and unaffected by personal values.
Thus, there was essentially one ‘right’ way of conducting forestry.
Over the years, the view of risk in terms of objective probability
has been strongly criticized.
Outcome risk as part of decision-making
In the 1970s, emphasis was increasingly placed on a conceptual-
ization of risk as part of the decision-making situation. The
decision-making situation, as such, has properties that make it –
or the risk that is part of it – appear less ‘objective’ than the
simplemeasure of relative frequency of a type of event. It typically
involves personal beliefs and preferences as well as theoretical
models (along with explicit and implicit assumptions about their
application). The decision-maker also often takes several types of
potential effect into account. It is unlikely that the expert and
other stakeholders would be in such complete agreement about
these features that it becomes possible to talk about one ‘right’
way of conducting forestry. It is more likely that the interested
parties disagree about some of these features. Moreover, it is not
given that theopinionofaparticularexpert shouldbegivenpriority,
particularly becausedifferencesmayemergebetween the risk per-
ceptions of two informed experts. Experts may have the same risk
concept, but their risk judgment may differ widely.
In decision theory, potential effects are often expressed as ex-
pected utility: the average utility of all possible outcomes under
certain circumstances, weighted according to the probability that
any particular event will occur. After estimating the expected utility
of different alternatives, the best one can be selected. To determine
the best alternative, a decision rule is needed. The fundamental de-
cision rule says that, in a given decision situation, we should choose
thealternativewithmaximumexpectedutility. In forestry, theutility
is sometimes measured as the net present value. To maximize the
expected utility, then, means to choose the decision alternative
with the maximum expected net present value.
Simple expected utility theory, however, may not be the effective
tool for riskassessment that it is sometimesproposedtobe.Theprob-
abilities forming part of the calculation of expected utilities can be
seen as either objective, as entities about which we may have
better or poorer knowledge, or subjective, or personal, as a
measure of the degree to which a person believes a proposition.
Theydiffer in theirconsequences fordecision-making.Objectiveprob-
abilities, such as frequencies, can be unknown to us. There may be
situationswherewesimplydonot knowhowprobable certain conse-
quences are. In these cases, expected utility calculations breakdown
andwe need some other decision rule, one that is not dependent on
probabilities. The choice of rule depends on how cautious onewants
to be. One possible cautious rule is to maximize the minimal
(maximin) utility so that the alternative action that has the least
Table 1 Overview of outcome and knowledge risk concepts
Risk is: Determinants References Examples
Objective Attributes in the world (Starr, 1969) (Outcome) Risks are relative frequencies of physical
harm.
Subjective (decision
theoretic)
Beliefs and preferences
concerning events
(Savage, 1954; Ramsey, 1990) (Outcome) Risks are personal (Bayesian) probabilities
for an unwanted event, or expert opinion on
plausibility and value of an unwanted event.
Socially constructed Social setting (Wynne, 1980, 2001) Our perceptions of (outcome) risk reflect shared
values and beliefs, such as ‘This is not normal’, ‘Life
is a lottery’ and ‘We do not trust this institution’.
Perceived Contextual and personal factors (Slovic, 1999) Catastrophic potential, involuntariness and
unfamiliarity affect what we perceive as risky
(outcome risk)
Felt (risk-as-feelings) Feelings, emotions and the
related response known in
psychology as ‘affect’
(Loewenstein et al., 2001; Slovic
et al. 2004)
Potential consequences that give rise to emotions (or
‘affect’), such as fear, have extra weight in risky
decisions (outcome risk).
Part of culture Cultural context (Douglas andWildavsky, 1983) Phenomena that are regarded as dangerous in the
particular culture to which one belongs are
conceived as (outcome) risks.
About knowledge
(knowledge risk)
Amount and quality of
information used in
decision-making
(Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1982;
Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1983;
Sahlin and Persson, 1994)
Decisions based on unreliable information yield
(knowledge) risk. Disregarding additional
predictions or explanations in decision-making
generates (knowledge) risk.
Forestry
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negative outcome is chosen (a classic review of decision rules under
uncertainty is presented in Savage (1954), which also contains an
elaborate theory of statistics based on personal probabilities).
An example of how different decision rules lead to different
decisions is provided in a Monte Carlo simulation study by Knoke
and Wurm (2006). They estimated the effects of wind damage,
snow breakage and insect attacks on the utility as net present
value of forests of Norwayspruce (Picea abies L. Karst.) and European
beech (Fagus sylvatica L.) in southern Germany when the timing of
harvest depended on a simulated timber price. Whilst the Norway
spruce forest maximized the expected utility, the utility for single ro-
tation periods fell within a wide range. The tree species alternative
that maximized the minimal utility was European beech with or
without anadmixture of 20 per cent Norway spruce. Applying a deci-
sion rule based on maximum expected utility may then lead to
recommended actions that are far from what the risk manager
(theforestowner) ispreparedtodo,basedonamaximindecisionrule.
Subjective probabilities are measures of degrees of belief
(Ramsey, 1926). As we believe any conceivable proposition to
some degree (it could even be to zero degrees), every proposition
that we can think of can, on this basis, be allocated a probability.
Given that a utility function exists, that is, ameasure of howconse-
quences of adecision are valued, it is always possible tomakedeci-
sions according to the principle of maximizing expected utility.
An obvious drawback of this simple view of decisions using per-
sonal probabilities is that there is no difference in decision-making
between decisions with well-informed degrees of belief and deci-
sions where the degrees of belief are based on poor (either in
quality or in quantity) information. This can be solved by allowing
people to assign sets, or intervals of probabilities, when they are
unsure of how strong their belief is. This approach requires newde-
cision rules. Several rules havebeenproposed in the literature (Levi,
1980; Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1982; Wally, 1991): one example is
the maximum minimal expected utility rule, where minimal ex-
pected utilities are calculated for each alternative among the differ-
ent probability distributions and the alternative with the highest
resultingexpectedutility ischosen.This isalsoacautioustypeof rule.
Just as with objective probabilities, a demand for a single prob-
ability distribution to be used in risk assessment may lead to risk
decisions that are not in accordancewithwhat a seemingly ration-
al forest owner chooses to do.
Risk perception
Psychologists often focus on people’s perceptions of risk, which
seemsto imply two related things (Table 1). First, that there is some-
thing – a risk – that can be perceived, a risk that presumably can be
observedandmightalsoexistexternal totheobserver (seeBrehmer,
1994). Second, that there is some objective reality that we can
measure perceptions of risk against. It is, perhaps, not the risk per
se thatexists independentlyofourperceptionsof it, but that riskybe-
haviour can be better or worse according to some objective stan-
dards. Among researchers in psychology, rational decision-making
is often equated with maximizing expected utility (see Sahlin et al.,
2010).From this viewpoint, it is tempting to seeexperts as supplying
risk assessments that are objective, analytical, wise and rational,
whereas the public’s perceptions of risk are subjective, often hypo-
thetical, emotional, foolish and irrational (Slovic, 1999).
Within psychological research,mucheffort hasbeendevoted to
identifying biases, patterns of irrationality that occur in particular
situations (for example, see Kahneman and Tversky, 1972) and
heuristic principles (simple decision rules that people use to
reduce complexity in a given decision situation) (Tversky and Kah-
neman, 1974). Some of these are of immediate relevance to risk
communication (for example, see Table 2 and Kahneman and
Tversky, 1979). The irrationality of heuristics and biases has been
discussed ever since they were introduced in the 1970s and the
controversy remains (see, for instance, Cohen, 1981; Lopes, 1991;
Todd and Gigerenzer, 2000; Holtug, 2002; Kuntz-Duriseti, 2004;
Brinck, 2005).
The plural nature of risk
Slovic and his colleagues suggested that the factors we take into
account when dealing with risk differ. They found, for instance,
that a small number of factors accounted for the difference in
risk perception that had been identified between experts and
laymen (Slovic et al., 1981). These factors suggest that experts
and laymen have different concepts of risk. Slovic (1994, p. 94)
expressed the point in the following way: ‘Although many obser-
vers have labelled public perceptions of risk irrational, the research
[. . .] paints a much different picture. First, whereas experts define
risk inanarrow,quantitativeway, thepublichasawider view,quali-
tative and complex, incorporating legitimate considerations such
as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic potential, and controllability
into the risk–benefit equation’.
From this perspective, risk does not appear to be one thing (or
concept) but many. At the very least, we cannot rely on a
common understanding of risk. The interested parties need to
define and play ‘the risk game’ (Slovic, 1998). By using this term,
Slovic suggested that the risk concept has similarities to a game.
Games have rules, time limits, criteria for winning and losing and
so on, but no rule, time limit, etc. is common to all games. The
general concept of a game – if there is one – cannot be defined
by listing necessary conditions for all games. The concept of risk,
Slovic claimed, is like the concept of a game. There are many
kinds of risk, and nothing relevant is common to all of them
(cf. Wittgenstein, 2009). For some time now, it has been popular
to categorize positions such as Slovic’s as social constructivist.
For instance, Bradbury (1989, p. 391) wrote that if acceptance
and acceptability of risk cannot be ‘analytically determined’, they
‘must be negotiated, that is, socially constructed’. We fear that
this view rests on a simplistic division between ‘risk as a physically
given attribute’ and ‘risk as a socially constructed attribute’. This
may not be problematic for Bradbury, who only discussed societal
risks, but the distinction is potentially harmful when generalized to
personal risk assessments and local ‘risk games’. Slovic’s position
does not presuppose social constructivismbut followsquite natur-
ally fromdifferences in the individuals’ decision-making situations.
However, it is clear that cultural and societal values and perspec-
tives have a role to play in shaping theway individuals understand
risk aswell aswhich risksweaccept. There are social dimensions as
well as other dimensions that need to be taken into account if we
want a more complete understanding of risk.
Risk as feeling – the emotional nature of risk
The emergence and contemporary popularity of dual process the-
ories in theories of judgment and decision-making are connected
both to the idea that rational decision-makers conform to
Understanding risk in forest ecosystem services
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something like the principle of maximizing expected utility and to
the fact that we often deploy heuristics and are prone to biased
judgments in ordinary life (for an overview, see Evans, 2008)
(Table 1). The basic idea is that decisions can be reached either
through a fast and intuitive system (resulting in heuristic decision-
making which, on occasion, gives rise to biases) or through a
slower, deliberate system essentially acting in accordancewith ra-
tionality norms. Sometimes, this is connected to ideas that the fast
intuitive system is governedmore byemotions (e.g. Finucane et al.,
2000; Loewenstein et al. 2001).Dual process theories are relatively
popular at the moment, but they produce few novel predictions
related to risk perceptions. Their role is, rather, to integrateprevious
research intoamorecomplex framework (it is, however,not certain
how successful this integration is, see Sahlin et al., 2010). There are
approaches to riskperception thatmaybeseenaspotentiallymore
productive.
Feelingsandemotions canclearlybeaproblem in thecontext of
riskassessment andcommunication. However, a lackof these sen-
timents can be an even more important problem. Feelings and
emotion can make us take action. Mere statistical information,
claimed Slovic (2007), sometimes paralyses us into inaction.
Roeser (2012) argued that communication about the risks of
climate change is often conducted in terms that are too abstract,
with the result that it does not motivate us; it should trigger emo-
tions. Recent findings show that personal experience of climate
change motivates individuals to take action (Blennow et al.,
2012). It is possible that this phenomenon occurs because emo-
tions are triggered by personal experience, but it might also be
the case that personal experience has an impact on our behaviour
in other ways – personal experience may change the strength of
belief the person has in climate change (cf. Blennow and Persson,
2009) or their preferences (without giving rise to emotions) and
this might be sufficient to instigate action.
The values at risk
Forests are important not only to their owners but also to the
general public. They provide wood and timber, they are important
for the global climate through their role in carbon sequestration,
water evaporation and condensation and oxygen production,
plus they provide opportunities to experience nature and for recre-
ation. Studies showdifferences in thevalueplacedon forestsbydif-
ferent groups of people (Edwards et al., 2012). For example, a high
value placed on the forest as a resource for timber and wood has
been found to be more common among forest owners than
among the Swedish general public (Eriksson, 2012). On average,
the Swedish public ascribes a higher value to biodiversity and rec-
reational benefits from the forest than forest owners do, although
only small differences have been found between the groups with
respect to thevalueof recreation in termsoffishingandhuntingac-
tivities (Eriksson, 2012). In spite of the differences found between
thegeneral publicand the forestowners, bothgroups showconsid-
erable variation in attitudes and people often put a high value on
deriving multiple benefits from the forest (Eriksson, 2012). Never-
theless, among private individual forest owners, the financial
return from the forest is often not the sole motivation to own a
forest. In Sweden, forestry on average contributes only 12 per
Table 2 Examples of biases and heuristics
Bias or
heuristic
Description Reference Example
Availability
heuristic
When people judge an event that immediately
comes to mind as more probable than
events that are less readily recalled
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1973) A higher proportion of Swedish private forest
owners believed in global warming in 2004
than after the cold winter in Sweden in 2010
(Blennow et al., 2012)
Confirmation
effect
When people tend to search for or interpret
information in a way that confirms their
preconceptions
(Bacon, 1620/2000), for a
review of modern
psychological studies, see
(Nickerson, 1998)
The public debate about container seedlings
has, according to (Hagner, 2005), focused on
the fact that damaged trees often have root
deformations. What has not been in focus is
whether healthy trees have root deformations
as well.
Certainty
effect
When people tend to discount uncertain future
outcomes in comparison with the certain
and immediate costs of action now
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) People would be reluctant to take measures to
reduce possible wind damagewhen
compared with the certain loss of production
caused by a reduction in the length of the
rotation period.
Framing effect When people are influenced by the way
equivalent decision problems are presented
(framed), i.e. whether they are presented
using positive words (gains) or negative
words (losses). This is known to affect how
risk-seeking people make choices (risky
choice framing), but also how attractive an
option is taken to be (attribute framing).
(Tversky and Kahneman, 1981;
Levin and Gaeth, 1988)
The Finnish rural public’s willingness to pay for a
hypothetical policy regulating regeneration
cutting was higher when the forest
management was described as involving
uncertainty as opposed to when framed as a
clearly defined management scenario (Rekola
and Pouta, 2005).
Forestry
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cent to the average private individual forest owner’s household
income (Mattsson et al., 2003).
The way that we deal with a risk is also influenced by how we
analyse and deal with the values at stake. To claim that something
has value can, in fact, mean many different things. In practical
decision-making, it is important, as far as possible, to be able to
measure and compare values on the same scale. This is usually
achieved by expressing all values in monetary terms. Doing so
also has its drawbacks, however. Monetary value is normally
decided by the market, but it is not the case that everything is, or
can be, bought and soldwithin amarket. Take, for example, the re-
lationship a forest owner has with a forest he planted with his
grandfather, which he has followed throughout his life and is
now managing together with his granddaughter (Blennow and
Persson, 2013). In situations like this, we have to use more or less
artificial means of assigning monetary value. That the methods
for assigning value differ (market versus contingent valuation
methods) means that it is not obvious that different values can
bemeasuredandcomparedalongthesamescaleevenwhenmea-
sured using the same unit.
Another problem with translating all types of values into mon-
etary terms is that we lose information in the process. There can
bemanydifferent reasonswhysomeonewants tobuyor sell some-
thingwithin themarket. Itmightbebecause theyvalue it asanend
in itself, because they see a value in it as a tool for achieving some
other value, or because they expect other people to value it and
plan to sell it to them. All these motives can be transformed into
a demand within a market and measured in monetary terms
(Blennow and Persson, 2013). This, in turn, means that the price
in money of, for instance, a forest depends on many things other
than the value of the forest in itself (the end value of the forest)
(Persson, 2008).
Knowledge risk and trust
Outcome risk is not the only kind of risk we have to consider in for-
estry. Epistemic risk – or knowledge risk, as we prefer to call the
type of epistemic risk we are interested in here – is the risk we
take or run when our decisions rest on an uncertain foundation –
decisions that are based on information that is insufficient or of
poor quality (Sahlin and Persson, 1994). In forestry, there always
seems to be the possibility that decisions may be associated with
adverse effects (outcome risk) and decisions involving outcome
risks normally also involve knowledge risks: we act on beliefs as if
we know theyare true, or base our decisions on one of two rival hy-
potheses, disregarding the other possible hypothesis (knowledge
risk: see Ga¨rdenfors and Sahlin, 1982 for a definition of this type
of epistemic risk). Sometimes, when we take knowledge risks, we
end up taking unwanted outcome risks simply because we have
not spotted them. We might decide on a particular course of
action because we think that we know more than we do. Our
beliefs may be likened to a map with which we navigate our way
through life (the idea originates from Ramsey (1929), who held
that a belief is ‘a map of neighbouring space by which we steer’).
Some continents on the map are sketched in the smallest detail;
others have blank spaces and others are perhaps a bit blurry
around their edges. Seeking knowledge means filling in the blank
spaces and sharpening the contours. In this analogy, you take a
knowledge risk when you only use a part of your map to lead you
forward, or if you take your incomplete map to be a true picture
of the whole world.
Knowledge risk is only indirectly about outcomes (Table 1).
However, the outcomes it is indirectly concerned with are the
same types of outcome that risk managers in forestry typically
worry about. One example of a knowledge risk situation in forestry
occurred when containers for growing and planting seedlings at
low cost were introduced on a large scale to Sweden to overcome
the difficulties of sowing and using bare-rooted seedlings (see
Sahlin and Persson, 1994;Hagner, 2005; Persson, 2007). The intro-
duction of containerized seedlingswasadirect response to aquest
for a more ‘rational forestry’. The first container that was intro-
duced by Svenska Cellulosa Aktiebolaget (SCA) in Sweden in the
early 1970s was a paper pot. SCA bought the entire planting
system from La¨nnen Sokeri, the Finnish sugar refinery. Other
Swedish forest owners also decided to use this or similar
systems. The system had originally been invented in Japan and
wasdesigned so that the rootswould beable to penetrate the con-
tainer walls and/or so that the containers would decompose after
some time in the soil. Hagner (2005,p. 212) reported that SCA pro-
duced12millionplants in paper potsbetween1971and1974.One
of the primary reasons why SCA decided to use the paper pot was
that they could buy the entire systemand start production at once.
The idea seems to have been to evaluate the paper pot system
whilst developing their own system. In 1973, the decision was
made to use plastic containers instead. ‘Kopparforssystemet’, a
smooth-walled conical container was introduced. Neither the
paper pot nor SCA’s own container was optimal. They have now
long since been replaced by other kinds of containers, such as the
JackPot that, ‘assisted by air canals, guiding rails, and copper-
containing paint, results in a root system that is very similar to
that of a naturally rooted seedling’ (Hagner, 2005, p. 213:
authors’ translation). The paper pots were also used in northern
Sweden and at high elevations, where the climate is colder and
the decomposition process slower than in the region where they
were originally designed to be used. Here, the systemdid not func-
tionwell. Rootsdidnotemerge fromthecell andcontinued togrow,
in spirals, affecting tree stability and the timber quality in mature
forests (Lindstro¨m and Rune, 1999). Spiralling roots were a
problemwith SCA’s owncontainer, too. However, the crucial differ-
ence was thought to be that the seedling only had to spend a few
months in the Kopparfors container (Hagner, 2005, p. 213). The
knowledge risk in this example arose when decision-makers
decided to act on the knowledge they had, knowledge that did
not, in fact, rule out the possibility that the paper pot system
would not function satisfactorily. Rather, the idea was to replace
it quickly with a better system, if needed. There was a problem
with this strategy, of course. Howwas it possible, quickly, to deter-
mine whether one system was better than another without first
knowing, for instance, how tomonitor the outcome risks of spiral-
ling roots? InSweden, therewasadivisionbetween ‘theconcerned’
(for an example, see Bergman and Ha¨ggstro¨m, 1973) and ‘the op-
timistic’ (Hagner, 2005, p. 221) about the consequences of early
root deformations (in pine especially). According to Hagner
(2005, p. 223), SCA founded their optimism and initial decision to
proceedon thebasisof a singlepaper – astudent’smaster’s thesis.
Clearly, the decision to use the containerized seedlings was
made on the basis of insufficient information and hence the
decision-maker took a knowledge risk. Even in 1999, the economic
consequences of the widespread use of containerized seedlings in
Understanding risk in forest ecosystem services
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Swedencouldnot beestimated (Lindstro¨mandRune, 1999).To cir-
cumvent someof theseknowledge risks, itwouldhavebeenneces-
sary to use information thatwas as robust as possible, aswell as to
be aware of the limits of knowledge (Sahlin and Persson, 1994).
(This is where alternative concepts of epistemic risk may differ
fromtheonepresented. Sometimes, epistemic risk is simplyunder-
stood as the risk of believing falsely or in failing to believe truly, irre-
spective of what ‘practical’ outcome risks this may lead to.)
We seldom have a full set of accurate information (in the sense
of exact information that is correct in every detail) thatweperhaps
would like to have for practical decision-making, but it is clear that
some contexts are more problematic than others. Certain factors
produce knowledge risks. Social scientists usefully distinguish
between internal andexternal validity (Campbell, 1957).Research-
ers aim to make correct inferences both about that which is actu-
ally studied (internal validity), for instance in an experiment, and
aboutwhat the results ‘generalise to’ (external validity). In thecon-
tainer seedling example, the limited internal and external validity
are two reasons why the knowledge risks were considerable. At
the time, SCA and the other Swedish forest owners knew relatively
little about the consequences of the root deformations that
they studied (lack of internal validity) and about how the results
could be generalized (lack of external validity). Both problems
were generated – nodoubt – by the perceived time-pressure to ra-
tionalize Swedish forestry and – perhaps – also bya strong prefer-
ence tomechanize it. Knowledge risks are easily generated bysuch
factors. The decision-makersmay bewell aware that the evidence
they have is not sufficient for an inference that one of their rival hy-
potheses is true and the others false; nevertheless, lack of internal
and external validity may prevent them from obtaining complete
information when deciding how to act. Other factors can be rele-
vant in other cases. Viswanath et al. (2012) examined the experi-
ences of scientists and practitioners working with transgenic
trees. It is widely accepted that field trials are crucial for under-
standing the value and adaptability of transgenic trees. In their
study, different kinds of regulations and bureaucratic procedures
turned out to be the major knowledge risk-producing factors. The
authors did not use the language of knowledge risk, but their con-
clusions contain – according to our perspective – a list of factors
generating knowledge risks that may discourage scientists and
practitioners from conducting field trials: ‘[. . .] uncertainties in
approvals and the time period to obtain permission; several years
ofmonitoring followingharvest to detect root sprouts or seedlings;
added costs of molecular characterization and permit preparation
even for familiar types of genetic modifications; special disposal
procedures for large amounts of tree biomass [. . .] It follows that
many scientific studies are likely to never be undertaken, and the
quality of studies that are done will frequently be of reduced
quality due to reduced size and scope. These conditions clearly
impede science and technology development’. (Viswanath et al.,
2012, p. 224)
The transgenic tree example is particularly interesting in that it
shows how attempts to manage the outcome risks involved in
transgenic tree growth and field trials can contribute to increased
knowledge risks in (future) decisions about such growth and field
trials. The regulations seem to lead to reduced quality in the infor-
mation we need tomonitor the outcome risks. In sum, the regula-
tions hinder researchers from assessing both the external and the
internal validity of preliminary results. Knowledge risk has, so far,
been largely overlooked in risk communication research.
Over the years, the role of trust – defined as a willingness to
depend – in the ‘sender’ (for instance, the risk-management pro-
fessional) has been proposed as a fundamental component in all
risk communication (Slovic 1999).Persson (2004)argued that ana-
lysis of the mechanisms behind trust can provide new opportun-
ities for risk communication. As we have seen, the knowledge
risksdependonthe reliabilityof theprocessesusedwhenassessing
the risk (Sahlin and Persson, 1994). Persson (2004)argued that the
‘receiver’ (for instance, the public or the private forest-owner)
needs to be able to assess the knowledge risks involved to have
trust in the senderof the information. To be able tomap the knowl-
edge risk, the receiver needs to be able to grasp the state of knowl-
edge in awider sense to help combine fragments into amap of the
whole (Persson, 2004). Not only is this approach promising with
respect to the efficacy of risk communication, it also provides an
approach that is ethically appealing because the individuals’
autonomyand reflective capacity is respected. It furthermore pro-
vides anopportunity for learningand for generalizations that prob-
ably have amore lasting effect on an individual’s decision-making
thanwhen the receiver is expected toaccept anassessment that is
provided to them acritically. Given the general complexity of a de-
cision situation and the subjective components involved, ideally a
risk communication situation would be a situation in which
parties exchange valuations and assessments, resulting in some
kind of management of risk (see Persson, 2004).
There aremore sources communicating risk than just experts or
governments, however. Forestownersmaygain informationabout
potential risksandtheirconsequences fromfamilymembers,other
forest owners, the media and so on. It is interesting to note that
these sourceswill bemore or less similar to the forest owner in im-
portant respects.Wecanspeculate that familymemberswill share
attitudesandvalueswith respect tomanyaspectsof the forest, not
onlyeconomicandenvironmental concerns, butalso the valueof a
beautiful landscape, or an interest in hunting. When taking advice
from others, we aremore influenced by thosewho express greater
confidence in theirdecisionsor recommendations (e.g. Sniezekand
Buckley, 1995; Sniezek and Van Swol, 2001), who are experienced
rather than inexperienced (e.g. Harvey and Fischer, 1997), have
good reputations rather than bad (e.g. Yaniv and Kleinberger,
2000; Yaniv and Milyavski, 2007) and who have a track record of
being accurate rather than inaccurate (e.g. Harries et al. 2004).
When preferences are likely to differ, advisors with similar prefer-
ences are preferred to those with less similar ones (e.g. Feick and
Higie, 1992; Gershoff et al., 2001) and such advice also appears
to lead to better decisions (e.g. Aksoy et al., 2006).
Distribution of risks
With respect to planning, risks and benefits can be assessed in dif-
ferent ways. An approach in which our aim is only tomaximize the
total numberof goodeffectsandminimize the total numberof bad
ones for thewhole population is called a utilitarian approach. If we
includeotheraspects, suchasa fairdistribution, respect for individ-
ual rights or the dignity of our acts among our aims, our approach
can be referred to as a rights-based or deontological.
Considering that it is very common that one person or group of
people make decisions about risks that affect others, it might be a
good idea to consider not just the size but also the distribution of
risks. The distribution of risks needs to be seen in relation to the
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distribution of benefits. In many cases, risks and benefits go to-
gether but it is common that the benefits and the risks resulting
from a decision fall on different groups. To have a clear idea of
their distribution is, therefore, important for both the communica-
tion and the handling of risks.
The basic answers towhat constitutes a fair distribution can be
divided into three groups (Frankena, 1963):
† equal distribution,
† distribution according to merit and
† distribution according to need.
Equal distribution means that risks and benefits should be distrib-
uted so that the risk is equally high for everyone. If applied to the
whole population, it means, for instance, that it is not acceptable
to manage a forest in a way that increases the profit for the
forest owner whilst imposing far-reaching risks on the whole of
society by destroying important ecosystem services. Neither is it,
according to this view, acceptable to demand that the forest
owners take on high economic risks for managing the forest in a
way thatmainly benefits the general public. Biodiversity protection
has been shown to be in higher demand by the general public than
by forest owners in Sweden (Eriksson, 2012).At the sametime, pro-
tectingbiodiversity can, in some instances, hamper timber produc-
tion. Sometimes, therefore, forest owners consider the presence of
a rare species in their forest to represent a risk to their freedom to
manage their forest according to their own aims. Forest owners
may not be prepared to take this risk (see Drake and Jones, 2002,
for example, from North America).
Distribution according tomeritmeans that everyone should get
what they deserve. This can, for instance, mean that the person
who creates the risk should take on more of the risk than people
whowere not involved in the decision. Applying this line of reason-
ing to forest insurancewouldmean that forest ownerswho exhibit
more risk-prone behaviour, which exposes the insurance company
to a higher risk, should be charged higher premiums. It can also
mean that if you take on a higher risk, you should also receive
more of the benefit. For example, when there is a conflict of inter-
ests between a forest owner who has invested work andmoney in
the forest and the general public, the interests of the forest owner
should be given priority according to this view of fair distribution.
Distribution according to need means that, for things like food
or medical attention, those who lack food or are more badly hurt
should receive more help quicker. When it comes to risk, it can be
interpreted as meaning that lower risks should be conferred on
those who are most vulnerable. For instance, those who live close
to a forest may be more vulnerable to what happens to the forest,
not just economically, but also in terms of aesthetic, health and cul-
tural values than those who own stocks in the timber industry but
who live far away from the forest.
To these three basic ideas about distribution, we can addmany
different versions and combinations. Identifying the distribution
that ismost ethically sound is amatter of controversy everywhere,
fromtheplayground to theUNand theperspective thatoneselects
in this controversy obviously also affects how the distribution of
risks and benefits are handled.We are not advocating any particu-
lar distribution of risk but we do want to stress the importance of
considering this question, not just as an exercise in political and
ethical theory, but as a very important practical consideration
with far-reaching consequences for all decisions regarding risks
and forestry.
The significance of the choice of conceptual
approach for ecosystemmanagement
The choice of how to conceive and define risk is not merely a case
of semantics. The result of an assessment depends on one’s ideas
of risk, and different assessment methods imply different oppor-
tunities for risk management, with strong implications for the
management of ecosystem services. For example, an influential
study that applied a model based on structures in society, such
as economicwelfare, level of education and institutions, predicted
the adaptation of forest management to climate change among
private forest owners to be more common in northern Europe
than in southern Europe, where the intensity of forest manage-
ment in general is lower (Lindner et al., 2010). However, Blennow
et al., (2012) reported that not only do private forest owners in
southern Europe undertake measures to adapt to climate
change but that a model of adaptation to climate change based
on two personal variables had significantly higher explanatory
and predictive power than a model based on several variables
related to structural information. The two personal variables,
strength of belief in local effects of climate change and strength
of belief in having experienced climate change, almost completely
explainedmeasures taken toadapt forestmanagement to climate
change. Thedifferentunderlying theoretical approachesof the two
studiesbyLindneretal. (2010)andBlennowetal. (2012)leadtodis-
tinctlydifferent conclusions. As aconsequence, fundamentally dif-
ferentsolutionsaresuggested to thesameproblem.Theauthorsof
the study relying on the general structural model concluded that
small and fragmented privately owned forests in southern
Europe are often poorly managed and constitute a barrier to effi-
cient wood resource utilization and adaptive management prac-
tices (Lindner et al., 2010). The opportunities suggested for
alleviating theconstraintsare the formationof forest co-operatives
and active support from public forestry administration (Lindner
et al., 2010). In contrast, Blennow et al. (2012) concluded that
when forest owners believe in, and see the effects of, climate
change, theyaremore likely to takeadaptivemeasures. Theoppor-
tunities to influence adaptation to climate change implied by this
result are through gathering and disseminating evidence of
climate change and its effects on increasing peoples’ perceptions
of having experienced it, and hence to consider the need to take
adaptive measures (Blennow et al., 2012).
The studybyBlennowet al. (2012) reflects anapproach inwhich
risk is seen as something that, at least partly, does exist in the phys-
icalworld. The strong emphasis on the belief in the risk and personal
experience of the risk points towards a conception of risks as some-
thing that we can experience and observe in a clearer manner than
either the decision-analytic or constructivist accounts of risk can
achieve. However, it shares with the decision-analytic approach
the basic idea that the outcome of a risk cannot be judged as un-
desirable without somebody making the valuation; both the prob-
ability of the undesired thing happening and the determination of
whether the risk is big or small. With respect to the management
of risk (adaptation), the point of departure is that our beliefs and
desires influence action. Hence, the approach is different from
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bothpurelyobjectiveandpurelydecision-analytic andconstructivist
approaches to risk.
Opportunities for effective risk communication
To be able to take account of the contribution of forest ecosystem
services to human well-being, we need information on the beliefs
and desires of the general public, including forest owners, as a
basis for risk communicationaswell as for planningand the formu-
lation of forest policies. To avoid the potential problem of inter-
preting the risk concept too narrowly, in this article we prefer the
term personal risk assessment to risk perception. The psychological
research on heuristics and biases, with its focus on how risks are
perceived and distorted, might help us understand how decision-
makers respond to risk, regardless of whether we regard these
responses as being irrational or not. Recent research has focused
on how information environments affect personal assessments
of risk and how the performance of various heuristics is affected
by different environments. In one version of this research, the
claim is for ecological rationality, that is, the idea that we should
see heuristics, not as sources of biases, but rather as practical
tools that lead to good (and sometimes even superior) decisions
in the environments to which they are adapted (Gigerenzer et al.,
1999). For instance, heuristics that ignore a large part of the avail-
able informationcansometimes lead tobetterpredictionsthande-
cision strategies tailored according to statistical and decision
theoreticnorms, suchasversionsof linear regressions (cf.Gigerenzer
et al., 2011).
More importantly in this context, there is nowa growing bodyof
knowledge about how different information environments affect
aspects related to personal assessments of risk. For instance, for
choices where the outcome(s) of the decision is (are) not known,
but the probabilities for the various outcomes are known, there
may be differences in how outcomes are assessed depending on
how the likelihood of an event is determined. Participants respond
differently when the likelihood of the event is described, that is,
given in terms of numerical probabilities (such as a gamble where
the probability of each outcome is described to participants), com-
pared with when it is experienced, that is, when participants are
given information sequentially, so that they experience occurrences
over time. Risky choiceswith respect to relatively rare events suchas
wind throw differ dramatically in these two cases: in the first case,
rare events are known to have more impact on decisions than they
are expected to given the norm, whereas in the second case, rare
events are instead given less weight. This is known as the descrip-
tion–experience gap in risky choices (cf. Hertwig and Erev, 2009).
Research such as this can help us to explain differences between
the responseof forestownersandresearchers, as in the introductory
example, to statistical information handed out by authorities or
resulting from research (encouraging decisions from description).
It also helps to explain differences in the responses to real events
(deciding from experience).
It is important that forest advisors appreciate the values and
beliefs of their clients to give advice that facilitates the client´s
ability to reach their goals. However, Kindstrand et al. (2008)
reported that Swedish forestadvisors, in general, significantlyover-
estimate the value private forest owners put on timber production,
both in the recent past and in the future, and they significantly
underestimate the value that forest owners put on the forest as
a source of opportunities for recreation and habitats for plants
and animals.
Even the format in which information is given influences the
types of errors that are made. For instance, the base rate fallacy
occurs when the prior probability of an event is ignored, in cases
when its conditional probability, given some evidence, is deter-
mined. A hypothetical example is given by the situation where a
device for unintrusively monitoring stem rot has been used to
help estimate the probability of stem rot infection in a certain
tree. The base rate fallacy occurs if the base rate of positive indica-
tion fromuninfected stems is ignoredwhendetermining how likely
it is that a particular tree for which the device signals stem rot is
infected. The base rate fallacy is known to decrease when likeli-
hoods are presented as natural frequencies (X cases out of 100)
rather than as single event probabilities (X%) (cf. Gigerenzer and
Hoffrage, 1995). Note that these phenomena not only have impli-
cations for how communicated risks are interpreted by forest
owners, forest managers and advisors, they are also a key to how
risks are perceived and acted upon in everyday life.
To provide an environment that promotes learning, we need to
create a situation characterized by openness, in which parties ex-
change valuations and assessments, thereby enabling the filling
in of gaps in their respective personal knowledge maps. We need
information about the preferences of the forest owner who
assigns a higher value to the flora than to avoiding wind damage
to the trees, members of the public who prioritize the opportunity
for recreation over timber production, the big forest company that
prioritizes the opportunity to ‘rationalise’ forestmanagement over
having a fully functioning system for regeneration and the old
forest ownerwhomanages the forest togetherwithhis grandchild.
All are examples of how risk communication can fail unless infor-
mation on the preferences of the communicating parties is pro-
vided. Communication also provides an opportunity to fill in gaps
in individuals’ knowledge maps. The forest owner who assigns a
high value to the flora might be unaware of the risk of wind
damage and how it will affect that flora, or whether there is an al-
ternative way to reduce the risk of wind damage that also leaves
the flora unaffected. Members of the public might be unaware
that a production forest could be more suitable for many recre-
ational activities than an unmanaged forest. The big forest
company might believe that it is easy to know when the plants
have been improved. We expect that this can lead to a direction
of integrating assessments that enable effective risk communica-
tion, even though the objective is not tomake parties change their
goals. Hence, we need knowledge about the beliefs and desires of
the parties to be able to provide information that is relevant to the
decision-maker. That thecommunicationworks inbothwayshelps
avoidmyopic views of a decision situation (see Sahlin and Persson,
1994).
Conclusions
Riskmanagement, communication and planning of forest ecosys-
tem services are complicated by uncertainty, insufficient informa-
tion or information of poor quality, limited cognitive capacity and
time, along with value conflicts and ethical considerations. Based
on a review of different interpretations of risk and results of empir-
ical studies, we suggest that risk has both subjective and objective
components and that the personal assessment of risk is decisive
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for the management of ecosystem services. Risk management,
communication and planning are sometimes facilitated by heuris-
tics. They also help us to understand how people make decisions
which, together with mutual information about beliefs and
desires, are important in all risk communications and help to fill
in gaps in personal knowledgemaps. Tohaveaclear ideaof thedis-
tribution of risk is, furthermore, important for risk management,
communication and planning in relation to forest ecosystem
services.
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